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LAND USE—DEVELOPMENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS
ZONING AND URBAN PLANNING LAW, 2018 TO THE
PRESENT
ROBERT M. TWISS*
The Massachusetts Appeals Court has actively interpreted zoning and
urban planning law during the past three years. These decisions have
produced significant developments in zoning and planning law
through the applications of the law to a variety of factual scenarios.
The appellate courts have reversed board and lower court decisions
on relatively minor distinctions from prior cases.
During the past three years, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court (SJC) handed down published decisions involving what
constitutes a “public use” of property taken by eminent domain, 1 lack
of standing claimed by an abutter, 2 the definition of educational
institutions under the Dover Amendment, 3 the Sub-Division Control

* Robert M. Twiss is a retired judge of the Superior Court of California, retired judge of
the U.S. Army Trial Judiciary, retired Assistant United States Attorney, and a former adjunct
professor at several law schools. He is a former United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of California. He is a member of the Bar in Massachusetts and California. He also is a member
of the American Planning Association and of the Massachusetts Chapter of the APA. The
opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone, and do not represent the views of any
federal, state, or local government, department or agency, or independent board, committee, or
commission.
1. Town of Sudbury v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 152 N.E. 3d 1101 (Mass. 2020).
2. Murchison v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 149 N.E. 3d 334 (Mass. 2020).
3. McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 131 N.E.3d 240 (Mass. 2019) (set
forth at section 3 of chapter 40A of the Massachusetts General Laws, the “Dover Amendment”
exempts, from local zoning laws, those uses of land and structures that are for educational
purposes).
249
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Act, 4 applicability of variances rather than a special permit, 5
dredging of sand adjacent to breakwaters, 6 affordable housing, 7 and
preemption of local zoning authority by the Commonwealth. 8

INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts Zoning Act authorizes individual cities and towns
to pass zoning bylaws, and describes the limits of that authority and the
manner in which it may be exercised.9 The Zoning Act allows the towns
to regulate the maximum and minimum dimensions of structures and lots
allowed in certain zoned areas. It also allows towns to regulate the uses
to which land in a given area may be put. 10
These decisions collectively make clear that local municipalities are
enabled under the Massachusetts Constitution and the Home Rule
Amendment to exercise their power to enact local zoning ordinances. The
courts will give great deference to the interpretation of those local zoning
bylaws by the local board so long as they are not based upon untenable
legal grounds or are unreasonable, whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary.
The cases also make clear that so long as the statutes and ordinances
are clear and unambiguous, the codes mean what they say. If the codes
are not clear and unambiguous, then they must be interpreted in a
reasonable and common-sense manner, taken in the context of the entire
statute. Standing and compliance with the deadlines for filing in the trial
courts and giving notice to the town or city clerk are jurisdictional, and a
failure to establish compliance is fatal to the legal action.
All of these cases are “fact-driven.” None of these decisions
announce landmark changes in the law, but there are very significant
results from the applications of that law to differing sets of facts. It is
clear that relatively minor, and often overlooked, distinctions in facts from
one case to another might cause two cases involving the same legal
principle to have opposite results.
I.

MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

The “themes” running through the zoning and planning decisions of
4. RCA Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121 N.E. 3d 1117 (Mass. 2019).
5. Bellalta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 116 N.E. 3d 17 (Mass. 2019).
6. Miramar Park Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Dennis, 105 N.E. 3d 241 (Mass. 2018).
7. 135 Wells Ave., LLC v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 84 N.E. 3d 1257 (Mass. 2017).
8. Roma, III, Ltd. v. Bd. of Appeals, 88 N.E. 3d 269 (Mass. 2018).
9. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, §§ 1–17 (2021).
10. See Am. Towers LLC v. Town of Shrewsbury, No. 17-10642-FDS, 2018 WL
3104105 (D. Mass. June 22, 2018).
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the SJC are that: the statutes mean what the statutes say; that the statutes
and bylaws must be interpreted reasonably and in context; and that zoning
and planning decisions inherently are fact-driven. The SJC took up the
issue of what constitutes a “public use” of land in Town of Sudbury v.
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. 11 “Under [the common-law
doctrine of ‘prior public use’], public lands acquired for one public use
may not be diverted to another inconsistent public use unless the
subsequent use is authorized by plain and explicit legislation.” 12
The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) acquired
several miles of “right of way” and intended to extend and operate mass
transportation. 13 The MBTA then sought to transfer an easement to an
electric company to install electrical lines underneath the right of way.14
Under the doctrine of prior public use, a party opposing the use must
establish “(1) a subsequent public use; (2) previous devotion of the
property to only ‘one public use’; (3) an inconsistent subsequent use; and
(4) a lack of legislative authorization.” 15
The court held that the electric company was a private entity rather
than a public entity and that the electric company’s proposed use of the
MBTA right of way was not a “public use.” 16 Therefore, the doctrine of
prior public use did not preclude the MBTA from entering into an option
agreement for an easement to place electrical lines underneath the right of
way. 17 The court declined to extend the doctrine of prior public use to a
private entity. 18
The SJC took up the presumption of standing enjoyed by an abutting
party in Murchison v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Sherborn. 19 In
Murchison, a landowner proposed to build a single-family residence on
his three-acre parcel of land. 20 The parcel met the local zoning
requirements in terms of minimum lot size and setback from the public
11. Town of Sudbury v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 152 N.E. 3d 1101, 1103 (Mass. 2020).
12. Id. (citing Robbins v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 244 N.E. 2d 577, 579 (Mass. 1969)). See
also Town of Brookline v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 258 N.E. 2d 284, 286 (Mass. 1970); Sacco v.
Dep’t of Pub. Works, 227 N.E. 2d 478, 479–80 (Mass. 1967).
13. Sudbury, 152 N.E. 3d at 1104–106.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1109 (citing Smith v. City of Westfield, 82 N.E. 3d 390, 399–401 (Mass.
2017)).
16. Id. at 1111–14
17. Id. at 1111.
18. Id. at 1113–14
19. Murchison v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 149 N.E. 3d 334 (Mass. 2020). All the facts
discussed herein are taken from the SJC’s published decision.
20. Id. at 337–39.
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street. 21 The lot is irregularly shaped and was, allegedly, narrower than
the width dimension specified in the zoning bylaw. 22
The neighbor across the street objected to the issuance of the building
permit, alleging that the construction would violate the lot width bylaw,
improperly increase the density of the neighborhood, and diminish the
value of his property. 23 The zoning board of appeals upheld the building
permit over the objection of the abutting neighbor, who appealed the board
decision to the land court. 24 The land court upheld the zoning board of
appeals; finding that the abutter had no standing because the landowner
had successfully rebutted the abutter’s presumption of standing. 25
The appeals court subsequently reversed the land court decision. 26
The appeals court held that the abutter’s claim was sufficient to establish
standing. 27 “[Massachusetts] General Laws c. 40A. § 17, allows any
‘person aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals’ to challenge that
decision in the land court. ‘A ‘person aggrieved’ is one who ‘suffers some
impingement of his legal rights.’” 28 Abutters and persons across the street
have a rebuttable presumption of standing pursuant to section 11 of
chapter 40A of the Massachusetts General Laws. 29
The appeals court determined that the proposed construction would
violate the local bylaw’s requirement of lot width and, therefore, cause a
higher level of housing density than anticipated under the bylaw. 30
Having reached that conclusion, the appeals court found that Murchison
had standing to contest the issuance of the building permit. 31 “A plaintiff
can . . . ’establish standing based on the impairment of an interest
protected by [a town’s] zoning by law.’ . . . Sherborn’s zoning bylaws
contain dimensional requirements that protect neighbors from
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 338.
25. Id. at 338; see generally Murchison v. Zoning Bd. Of Appeals (Murchison Appeal),
132 N.E. 3d 1081, 1084–85 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019).
26. Murchison Appeal, at 1088.
27. Id. at 1088 (the abutter claimed that a violation of the lot width bylaw would
improperly increase the density of housing in the neighborhood).
28. Id. at 1084.
29. Id. at 1084–85; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 11 (2021) (“Parties in interest” as
used in this chapter shall mean the petitioner, abutters, owners of land directly opposite on any
public or private street or way, and abutters to the abutters within three hundred feet of the
property line of the petitioner as they appear on the most recent applicable tax list . . . .).
30. Murchison Appeal, at 1085–86.
31. Id. at 1086.
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overcrowding. The minimum lot width requirement at issue here is a
prime example.” 32
The SJC, agreeing with the land court’s findings of fact and law
regarding standing, reversed the appeals court decision. 33 The SJC noted
that
while the plaintiffs have presumptive standing, the presumption may
be rebutted by a showing that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs’
“claims of aggrievement are not within the interests protected by the
applicable zoning scheme.”
While “density, traffic, parking
availability, [and] noise” have been denoted “typical” interests
protected by G.L. c. 40A and zoning bylaws, there is nothing to
demonstrate that the purpose of Sherborn’s dimensional lot width
zoning requirement is to control density or overcrowding generally, or
to protect an abutter’s interests in particular. 34

The abutter in Murchison testified that the proposed construction
would reduce the value of his house. 35 The abutter was not an expert
witness and had an obvious bias or prejudice based upon his claim of
reduction in value of his property. 36 The landowner rebutted with an
expert witness who testified that construction of the defendants’ home
would not diminish plaintiff’s property value. 37 “Rather, it was her
opinion that a single-family residence is the ‘best and highest use’ of [the
lot], and that such a residence, accompanied by landscaping, would
improve the lot compared with its current condition as a vacant cleared
lot.” 38
The abutter did not present any expert testimony to rebut the defense
expert and did not present any evidence to “establish that the minimum lot
width bylaw was intended to protect the value of [plaintiff’s] property.” 39
The court found that the abutter did not have standing because he had not
established that he was “aggrieved” within the meaning of chapter 40A of
the Massachusetts General Laws. 40 The trial judge also resolved
competing proffers of evidence with regard to whether construction would
damage the abutter’s property with excessive water runoff, finding that
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 1086 (alteration in original).
Murchison v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 149 N.E. 3d 334, 342 (Mass. 2020).
Id. at 339–40 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 337.
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the abutter’s evidence was insufficient to establish standing based upon
harm due to runoff. 41
The bottom line for which Murchison stands is that it is not enough
to simply allege a violation of some provision of the local zoning bylaw
in order to establish standing. 42
[M]erely alleg[ing] a zoning violation . . . cannot be sufficient in itself
to confer standing . . . . Standing as an “aggrieved” person requires
evidence of an injury particular to the plaintiffs, as opposed to the
neighborhood in general, the injury must be causally related to
violation of the zoning laws, and it must be more than de minimus. 43

Murchison reminds us that a trial judge sitting without a jury has the
opportunity to see, hear, and evaluate the weight of the evidence and
credibility of the witnesses. 44 The trial court did so in Murchison, and the
SJC upheld those findings. 45
In The McLean Hospital Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of
Lincoln, 46 the court held that a residential program was an educational
institution within the meaning of the Dover Amendment.47 The court
reasoned that the program, while unconventional, “[was] designed to
instill fundamental life, social, and emotional skills in adolescent males
who are deficient in these skills, who experience severe emotional
dysregulation, and who have been unable to succeed in a traditional
academic setting.” 48 As a result, the program’s pedagogical functions and
goals allowed McLean Hospital to be relieved from the zoning regulations
as an educational institute. 49
As part of their residential program, the McLean Hospital intended
“to develop a residential life skills program for fifteen to twenty-one year
old males who exhibit extreme ‘emotional dysregulation.’ The program
would allow these adolescents to develop the emotional and social skills
41. Id.
42. Id. at 340.
43. Id.
44. See generally Murchison v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 149 N.E. 3d 334 (Mass. 2020).
45. See generally id.
46. McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Lincoln, 131 N.E. 3d 240 (Mass. 2019). All the
facts discussed herein are taken from the SJC’s published decision.
47. Id. at 244; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3 (2021) (known as the Dover
Amendment, this section provides in relevant part that “[n]o zoning ordinance or by-law
shall . . . prohibit, regulate or restrict the use of land or structures for . . . educational purposes
on land owned or leased by . . . a nonprofit educational corporation“).
48. Id. at 244.
49. Id. at 250–51.
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necessary to return to their communities to lead useful, productive
lives.” 50 The school’s curriculum would utilize several recognized
professional psychological counseling programs. 51 Despite this, the
zoning board of appeals determined that the facility was to be operated as
a “medical or therapeutic, as opposed to educational” facility.52
The land court upheld the zoning board of appeals. 53 McLean
subsequently appealed and the SJC allowed for a direct appellate review.54
On review, the SJC re-affirmed its
two-pronged test to determine whether a proposed use falls within the
protections of the Dover Amendment. First, the use must have as its
“bona fide goal something that can reasonably be described as
‘educationally significant.’” Second, the educationally significant
goal must be the “‘primary or dominant’ purpose for which the land
or structures will be used.” 55

After an in-depth analysis of the educational aspects of the proposed
program at McLean, the court concluded that “[a]lthough ‘emotional or
psychiatric programs may determine the character of the . . . proposed
facility,’ they certainly ‘do not mark the facility as ‘medical’ or render it
any less educational.’” 56 The court ultimately held that “the proposed
facility and its skills-based curriculum fall well within the ‘broad and
comprehensive’ meaning of ‘educational purposes’ under the Dover
Amendment.” 57
In RCA Development, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brockton,
the court undertook a discussion of the Subdivision Control Act. 58 Under
section 81O of the Act, “[n]o person shall make a subdivision of any land
in any city or town in which the subdivision control law is in effect unless
he has first submitted to the planning board of such city or town for its
approval of a plan of such proposed subdivision.” 59 “Generally,
50. Id. at 243.
51. Id. at 245, 248.
52. Id. at 243–44.
53. Id. at 244.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 246 (citations omitted) (quoting Regis Coll. v. Town of Weston, 968 N.E. 2d
347 (Mass. 2012); Whitinsville Ret. Soc’y, Inc. v. Town of Northbridge, 477 N.E. 3d 407, 410
(Mass. 1985).
56. Id. at 248.
57. Id. at 244.
58. RCA Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121 N.E.3d 1117 (Mass. 2019).
59. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 81O (2021); see also RCA Dev., Inc., 121 N.E. 3d at
1119–20.
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‘subdivision’ means the division of a tract of land into two or more lots.” 60
In 1964, the owner of a lot designated as “lot 46” transferred the
northern half of his lot to the owner of the lot to the immediate north, and
the southern half of his lot to the owner of the lot to the immediate south
(lot 47). 61 The transfer was not submitted to the municipal planning board
for approval. 62
In 2016, a subsequent owner of the southern half of lot 46 and of lot
47 applied for a permit to build a residence on the southern half of lot 46. 63
The building inspector denied the permit and the zoning board of appeals
upheld the denial. 64 Critical to the denial of the building permit was
whether the 1964 transfer of the southern half of lot 46 was a
“subdivision” within the meaning of the Subdivision Control Act. 65 If it
were, then the permit was properly denied. 66 If it were not a
“subdivision,” then it would be error to deny the permit. 67
There is an exception to the definition of “subdivision” in section
81L of chapter 41 of the Massachusetts General Laws, which provides that
a division of land is not a subdivision within the meaning of the
Subdivision Control Act if the lot so divided has frontage on a “public
way” in the amount of frontage and depth as required under the municipal
zoning ordinance. 68 The land court reversed the zoning board of appeals,
finding that the 1964 transfer of the two halves of lot 46 was not a
“subdivision” within the meaning of the Subdivision Control Act. 69 The
land court found that the southern half of lot 46 was of adequate size and
depth, and had adequate frontage on a public way, as of the date of transfer
in 1946. 70
The SJC agreed with the land court, finding that the 1964 transfer
was not a “subdivision” within the meaning of the Subdivision Control
Act, and no submission to the planning board was necessary. 71 The
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
(2021).
70.
71.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 81L (2021).
RCA Dev., Inc., 121 N.E. 3d at 1118.
Id. at 1118–19.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 81L (2021).
RCA Dev., Inc., 121 N.E. 3d at 1119.
Id. at 1119.
See id. at 1120.
RCA Dev., Inc., 121 N.E. 3d at 1120; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 81L
RCA Dev., Inc., 121 N.E. 3d at 1120.
Id. at 1120.
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municipality also argued that the landowner was required to submit an
application for endorsement as “Approval Not Required” (ANR), under
section 81P of the Act. 72 The land court found, and the SJC agreed, that
an application for an ANR endorsement was permissive, and not
mandatory. 73 The bottom line of the SJC’s decision was simply that the
statute means what the statute says: “where the language of a statute is
plain and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent.” 74
One of the more confusing matters of zoning and planning law is the
distinction between when one needs a special permit, and when one needs
a variance, or if one needs both. This issue frequently arises in the context
of section 6 of chapter 40A of the Massachusetts General Laws, which
deals with changes, modifications, or alterations to buildings and/or lots
which have become nonconforming due to a subsequent amendment to
the zoning code. 75 Section 6 provides, in relevant part,
[A] zoning ordinance or by-law shall not apply to structures or uses
lawfully in existence or lawfully begun, . . . but shall apply to any
change or substantial extension of such use . . . to any reconstruction,
extension or structural change of such structure and . . . to provide for
its use for a substantially different purpose or for the same purpose in
a substantially different manner or to a substantially greater extent
except where alteration, reconstruction, extension or structural change
to a single or two-family residential structure does not increase the
nonconforming nature of said structure. 76

The homeowners in Bellalta v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brookline
ran into a section 6 issue when they attempted to modify their roof. 77
In Bellalta, the property at issue was a second story condominium in
a two-family house that was considered nonconforming because the Floor
Area Ratio (FAR) 78 exceeded the maximum provided in the zoning
bylaw. 79 The homeowners sought to build a dormer which would add 677
square feet of floor space, thereby increasing the amount of the
72. Id. at 1120–21; see generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 81P (2021).
73. Id. at 1121.
74. Id.
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2021).
76. Id.
77. Bellalta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 116 N.E. 3d 17 (Mass. 2019).
78. Floor Area Ratio “compares the gross floor area of the building to the area of the lot
upon which it is built.” Bellalta, 116 N.E. 3d at 21 n3 (citing INST. FOR LOC. GOV’T, Land Use
and Planning: Glossary of Land Use and Planning Terms 24 (2010), https://www.cailg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/2010_-_landuseglossary.pdf).
79. Bellalta, 116 N.E. 3d at 20–21.
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nonconforming floor area ratio. 80
The zoning board of appeals approved the application, entering a
finding upon the record that “‘the specific site is an appropriate location
for such a use, structure, or condition,’ and ‘the use as developed will not
adversely affect the neighborhood.’” 81 The homeowners neither sought
nor received a variance. 82
An abutting property owner appealed the board’s decision to the land
court, alleging that a variance was necessary to permit the construction
because the project increased the extent of the nonconformity. 83 The
abutting property owner argued that if a renovation or replacement adds
new non-conformities, or substantially increases an existing nonconformity, the applicant must secure a variance for the project.84
Here the structure was nonconforming due to the FAR. 85 The
homeowners sought to increase the amount of the nonconformity. 86 The
Zoning Board and the homeowners agreed that the proposal did “increase
the nonconforming nature of said structure.” 87 As such, the abutting
property owner argued that the language in section 6, as quoted above,
strongly suggested that a variance was necessary. 88
For single or two-family residential structures, however, section 6
provides that
[p]re-existing nonconforming structures or uses may be extended or
altered, provided, that no such extension or alteration shall be
permitted unless there is a finding [by the board] that such change,
extension or alteration shall not be substantially more detrimental than
the existing nonconforming [structure or] use to the neighborhood. 89

However, the Bellalta court observed that “[t]he language of G.L. c.
40A, § 6 has been recognized as particularly abstruse.” 90
Compare Bellalta in which the court looked to legislative intent
because it found the language of section 6 of the Zoning Act to be anything
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23–24
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2021).
Bellalta, 116 N.E. at 23.
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but clear and ambiguous to the court not looking at legislative intent in
RCA Development because it found the language of section 81L of the
Subdivision Control Act to be clear and unambiguous. 91 The court in
Bellalta had to determine what the Legislature intended when it amended
section 6 adding the two apparently inconsistent sentences quoted
above. 92
“As with all matters of statutory interpretation,” a court construing a
zoning act must “ascertain and effectuate legislative intent,” as
expressed in the statutory language. Where, as here, “the meaning of
[the] statute is not clear from its plain language, well-established
principles of statutory construction guide our interpretation.” Specific
provisions of a statute are to be “understood in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole, which includes the preexisting
common law, earlier versions of the same act, related enactments and
case law, and the Constitution.” A reviewing court’s interpretation
“must be reasonable and supported by the history of the statute.”
Ultimately, we must “avoid any construction of statutory language
which leads to an absurd result,” or that otherwise would frustrate the
Legislature’s intent. 93

The court was aware that section 6 had been a part of Chapter 40A
for some time, codified the pre-existing common law on the subject, and
had been amended several times. 94 Normal statutory interpretation holds
that the legislature is assumed to know the existing law when it amends a
statute, and that it intends to adopt the prior interpretation.95
Here the court concluded that the Legislature intended to allow a
homeowner to change, alter, or extend a nonconformity in a one or twofamily house. 96 It was considered as a matter of right, so long as it would
“not be substantially more detrimental than the existing nonconforming
[structure or] use to the neighborhood.” 97 As a result, the Court held that
a variance was not necessary. 98

n3.

91.

Compare Bellalta, 116 N.E. 3d at 24–26 with RCA Dev., Inc., 121 N.E. 3d at 1119

92. Bellalta, 116 N.E. 3d at 24–26.
93. Id. at 24 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
94. Id. at 27–28.
95. Id. at 28 (citing SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 77:7 (8th ed. 2018)).
96. Id. at 25–26.
97. Id. at 20 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2021)).
98. Id. at 28 (citing Rockwood v. Snow Inn Corp., 566 N.E. 2d 608, 610–11 (Mass.
1991)) (“single- and two-family residences are given ‘special protection’ with regard to their
existing nonconformities”); see also In re Estate of Kendall, 159 N.E. 3d 1023, 1028 (Mass.
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In early 2021, the SJC heard oral argument on two zoning and
planning cases involving chapter 94G, Section 3 of the Massachusetts
General Laws: 99 Mederi v. City of Salem 100 and CommCan, Inc. v. Town
of Mansfield. 101 In Mederi v. City of Salem, the issue was whether the
City of Salem should be compelled to enter into a Host Community
Agreement (HCA) for the placement of a retail marijuana establishment
within the City.102 The SJC held that “[n]othing in [section 3] imposes a
duty on a city or town to enter into an HCA with a prospective recreational
marijuana establishment simply because that establishment is able to
fulfill the municipality’s HCA requirements.” 103
In CommCan, Inc. v. Town of Mansfield, the issue was whether the
appellant should be allowed to convert an approved medicinal marijuana
dispensary into a recreational marijuana dispensary that was otherwise
blocked by the town’s zoning bylaw. 104 The SJC held that CommCan was
engaged in the business of selling marijuana products despite not actually
selling any products. 105 As a result, the zoning restrictions established in
Chapter 94G Section 3a prohibited the Town of Mansfield from
preventing CommCan from converting their medicinal marijuana
dispensary into a recreational marijuana dispensary. 106
In addition to the cases summarized above, The SJC issued three
noteworthy opinions in 2018. In 135 Wells Ave, LLC v. Housing Appeals
Committee, a case in which the underlying issue was construction of
2020) (“We ordinarily construe statutes to be consistent with one another, reading them as a
harmonious whole ‘so that effect is given to every provision in all of them.’”); Commonwealth
v. Montarvo, 159 N.E. 3d 682, 684 (Mass. 2020) (citations omitted) (“Legislative intent controls
our interpretation of statutes. ‘To determine the Legislature’s intent, we look to the words of
the statute, construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in
connection with the cause of enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the
main object to be accomplished.’”); Clement v. Owens-Clement, 159 N.E. 3d 164, 172 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2020) (“Although we look first to the plain language of the provision at issue to
ascertain the intent of the Legislature, we consider also other sections of the statute, and examine
the pertinent language in the context of the entire statute.”).
99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 3 (2021).
100. Mederi v. City of Salem, 171 N.E. 3d 158 (2021).
101. CommCan v. Town of Mansfield, 173 N.E. 3d 19 (2021).
102. Mederi v. City of Salem, 171 N.E. 3d 158 (2021).
103. Id. at 166–67.
104. CommCan, 173 N.E. 3d at 22–23 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94G, § 3(a)(1))
(2021)).
105. Id. at 23–24 (the plaintiffs acquired the required licensing, executed a host
community agreement with the town and procured a special permit from the town so “[i]t hardly
can be said that the plaintiffs were not ‘involved in’ and ‘occupied’ by the sale of marijuana,
even though the dispensary is not yet operational.”).
106. Id. at 23–24.
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affordable housing, the court again stated the basic rule of statutory
interpretation. 107 “In interpreting a statute, we begin with its plain
language, as the best indication of legislative intent. We interpret
particular language within a statutory provision with respect to the statute
as a whole.” 108
The court discussed the role and impact of federal and state
preemption 109 on local zoning regulation in Roma III, Ltd. v. Zoning Board
of Appeals of Rockport. 110 In Roma, a homeowner built his own personal
helicopter landing area at his oceanfront home in a residential district.111
The town issued an enforcement order instructing him to stop using his
residence as a landing area, and the zoning board of appeals upheld the
building inspector. 112
The homeowner argued before the SJC that the state had preempted
regulation of helicopter operations, including landing and taking off, in
the Massachusetts Aeronautics codes. 113 The SJC found a distinction
between flight operations, which were preempted, and permitted
regulation of private aircraft landing sites, “which involves local control
of land.” 114 The court also relied upon the Home Rule Amendment to the
Massachusetts Constitution. 115 The Home Rule Amendment provides, in
relevant part, “any city of town may, by the adoption, amendment, or
repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, exercise any power or function

107. 135 Wells Ave., LLC v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 84 N.E. 3d 1257 (Mass. 2017). All
the facts discussed herein are taken from the SJC’s published decision.
108. Id. at 1265 (citation omitted); see also RCA Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
121 N.E.3d 1117 (Mass. 2019).
109. The doctrine of preemption originates from the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution, which provides that
this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .” “A Federal
statute may preempt State law when it explicitly or by implication defines such an
intent, or when a State statute actually conflicts with Federal law or stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of Federal objectives.
Roma, III, Ltd. v. Bd. of Appeals, 88 N.E. 3d 269, 275 (Mass. 2018) (citations omitted). “State
preemption analysis is similar to Federal preemption analysis in that we determine whether the
Legislature intended to preclude local action, recognizing that ‘the legislative intent to preclude
local action must be clear.’” Id. at 276 (quoting Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 476 N.E. 2d 585,
589d (1985)).
110. See generally id.
111. Id. at 271.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 276; see generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 35–52 (2018).
114. Id. at 276.
115. Id. at 276–77; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch 43B, § 13 (2018).
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which the general court has power to confer upon it, which is not
inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court.” 116
The court did find that the Legislature had expressed an intent to
foster private flying within the Commonwealth. 117 The court also found,
however, that “the legislative purpose of ‘fostering private flying’ does
not suggest a legislative intent to encourage the development of private
heliports and landing areas so that persons may land their helicopters and
aircraft on their own private property.” 118
Where land use regulation has long been recognized by the Legislature
to be a prerogative of local government, we will not infer that the
enactment of the aeronautics code reflects a clear legislative intent to
preempt all local zoning bylaws that might affect noncommercial
private restricted landing areas based upon the risk of frustrating the
legislative purpose of fostering private flying.
. . . If the Legislature wishes to preempt local zoning regarding
noncommercial private restricted landing areas, it must provide a
clearer indication of such intent. 119

Strictly speaking, Miramar Park Association v. Town of Dennis, 120
in contrast, is not a zoning or planning decision. But it is, nevertheless,
relevant to planners, lawyers, and public officials in coastal communities.
In Miramar Park, the town dredged the mouth of a river adjacent to
a breakwater in order to protect the free movement of water to and from
the wetlands, the river, and Nantucket Sound. 121 The town deposited the
sand which it dredged on a nearby public beach in order to enhance its
dunes. 122 Property owners fronting on the river where the dredging took
place claimed that the town should have used the materials to enhance the
dunes on the homeowners’ private beach adjacent to the river.123
The Wetlands Protection Act, section 40 of chapter 131 of the
Massachusetts General Laws, “was created to protect wetlands from
destructive intrusion, . . . and . . . governs the dredging of wetlands and
lands bordering waters.” 124 The Commonwealth has promulgated

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43B, § 13 (2018); see also Roma, III, Ltd, 88 N.E. 3d at 274.
Roma, III, Ltd, 88 N.E. 3d at 277.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 278–79 (citations omitted).
Miramar Park Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Dennis, 105 N.E. 3d 241 (Mass. 2018).
Id. at 245–49.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 244 (citation omitted).
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regulations pursuant to this statute in order to protect wetlands. 125
The SJC found that the town had not violated either the statute or the
regulations, vacated the lower court injunction requiring the town to
periodically nourish Miramar Beach, and reversed summary judgment
which had been entered in favor of the plaintiff Miramar Beach
Association. 126 The significance of the case is not the conclusion reached
by the court, which largely was fact-driven, but rather the existence of the
statute and regulations, and the impact upon the communities which are
affected by those laws.
II. MASSACHUSETTS APPEALS COURT AND FEDERAL COURTS
The Appeals Court of Massachusetts handed down over forty zoning
and planning decisions during 2019 and 2020, both published and
unpublished. 127 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
and the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
handed down an additional thirteen zoning and planning related
decisions. 128
Among the issues appearing repeatedly in the recent decisions are
jurisdiction and standing, timeliness in appealing the town board decision,
failure to provide notice of the judicial action to the town clerk, merger of
adjoining lots, misinterpretation of municipal zoning bylaws by the local
board, and construction of cell phone towers.
A. Jurisdiction
There are four primary jurisdictional sub-issues presented in the
previously discussed zoning and planning cases in the last three years.
Those issues were: presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction;
standing; timeliness in filing an appeal from the zoning board of appeals
or planning board decision; and failure to give timely notice of the judicial
action to the city or town clerk.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal and state courts must have both subject matter jurisdiction
125. See 310 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 10.00–10.37 (2021); see also Miramar, 105 N.E.
3d at 244.
126. Miramar, 105 N.E. 3d at 252–53.
127. Not counting Appeals Court decisions for which the SJC subsequently issued an
opinion.
128. MASS. APP. CT. R. 23 (Unpublished decisions of the United States courts of appeals
and United States district courts are not precedent, not binding on other courts, and may not be
cited as authority, but you might find the reasoning and logic to be persuasive and useful).
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and in personam jurisdiction over the parties in order to entertain a judicial
action. Occasionally one or the other, or both, are not present and the
court is not able to adjudicate the plaintiff/petitioner’s claims.
The vast bulk of the zoning and planning cases decided in
Massachusetts during the past three years were filed under either the
Massachusetts Zoning Act, chapter 40A of the Massachusetts General
Laws, or the federal Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 332. There
were a few cases under the Massachusetts Subdivision Control Act,
sections 81K through 81GG of chapter 41 of the Massachusetts General
Laws, and a few miscellaneous civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, or the Massachusetts Urban Redevelopment Act, chapter 121B of
the Massachusetts General Laws.
2.

Standing

The appeals court resolved standing questions as the primary issue in
ten cases during the past three years. The appeals court found in published
decisions that an abutter who is sufficiently far away from the locus that
there was no significant injury to his property rights has no standing, 129
and that a property owner whose factual assertions were raised only in an
overly conclusory manner also did not have standing. 130 In unpublished
decisions, 131 the appeals court found that an abutter to an abutter whose
property is eighty-three feet away from the locus property, cannot see the
proposed property from inside of her residence, and enters her residence
from a different street does not have standing, 132 and that a plaintiff whose
alleged injuries are not distinguishable from those suffered by others in
Standing is
the neighborhood also does not have standing. 133
jurisdictional, and it can be raised sua sponte by the trial judge hearing the

129. Talmo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 107 N.E. 3d 1188, 1194–95 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).
130. Hickey v. Conservation Comm’n, 107 N.E. 3d 510, 513 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).
131. Summary decisions issued by the appeals court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as
appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73
Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009)), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully
address the facts of the case or the panel’s decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are
not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided
the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008,
may be cited for its persuasive value, but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding
precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 881 N.E. 2d 792, 794 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
132. Murrow v. Emery, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1119, 2018 WL 3402106, at *4 (July 13,
2018).
133. Ricker v. 3353 Wash. LLC, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1121, 2018 WL 3673190, at *1 (Aug.
3, 2018), rev. denied, 480 Mass. 1110 (2018).
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appeal from the municipal zoning board of appeals or planning board. 134
In Talmo v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framingham, the immediate
abutter challenged a permit allowing a landowner to convert a barn on his
property from an illegal dwelling unit to an accessory use as “additional
living space for main house.” 135 Years before, a prior landowner illegally
converted the barn to a dwelling without the required permits. 136 The
immediate abutter sought enforcement action to terminate the use of the
barn as a residence. 137
The zoning board of appeals ordered the building commissioner to
take action to enforce the zoning bylaw. 138 The applicant then removed
the cooking facilities from the barn and sought a permit to convert the
illegal dwelling into an accessory use for the main house.139 That
application was granted, and the immediate abutter brought suit in the land
court contesting the order. 140
At trial, the court entered findings of fact: that the abutter’s house
was located 250 feet from the barn; that “landscaping partially obscure[d]
the view;” and “that the distance between the two houses is great enough
that it is virtually inconceivable that traffic, noise or light from the former
barn . . . could disturb or injure [the plaintiff].” 141 The trial court found
that “[a] person is ‘‘aggrieved’ if he suffers some infringement of his legal
rights.’ ‘The injury must be more than speculative,’ and also must be
‘special and different from the concerns of the rest of the community.’
‘Aggrievement requires a showing of more than minimal or slightly
appreciable harm.’” 142
The appeals court found that the plaintiff did not establish the
necessary level of aggrievement, and therefore did not have standing to
bring his challenge. 143 But, in Murrow v. Emery, an unpublished appeals
134. Talmo, 107 N.E. 3d at 1192 (citing Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health &
Retardation Ass’n, Inc., 653 N.E. 2d 589, 59091 (Mass. 1995) and 81 Spooner Rd., LLC v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 954 N.E.2d 318, 326 n.12 (Mass. 2012)); see Braxton v. City of Boston,
138 N.E. 3d 440, 446 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019) (alterations in original) (“Because ‘the issue of
‘standing’ is closely related to the question of whether an ‘actual controversy’ exists, . . . we
have treated it as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.’”).
135. Talmo,107 N.E. 3d at 1191.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1193.
142. Id. at 1194 (citations omitted).
143. Id.
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court decision, the court found that an abutter to an abutter who could not
see the locus property from inside of her residence and entered off a
different street did not have standing to bring suit. 144
Standing can be transitory; one who legitimately has standing at one
point in the proceeding might lose standing before resolution of all issues.
In Maroney v. Planning Board of Haverhill, the plaintiff was a builder
who sought to construct a fifty-lot subdivision. 145 The city granted a
special permit for a cluster development, and the planning board approved
the subdivision plan. 146
There was a condition in the special permit that the plaintiff shall
construct a water pumping station for those lots for which there was not
already adequate water pressure. 147 The plaintiff then began constructing
those lots for which there was adequate water pressure. 148 Those lots were
released, construction was completed, and certificates of occupancy were
issued. 149
The plaintiff then began construction on the lots for which water
pressure was not adequate, and for which he was required to build a water
pumping station, but before he constructed the pumping station. 150 The
city building inspector issued a cease and desist order, and warned that if
the plaintiff continued construction, he would be subject to daily
penalties. 151 The plaintiff ceased construction pursuant to the notice. 152
The plaintiff then sought a mandatory injunction in the superior court
asking that the city be ordered to release the lots for construction, alleging
that the condition of the special permit required only that he complete the
pumping station before occupancy, not before construction. The city
assessed a fine of $687,700, and counter-claimed for judgment in that
amount. Before litigation finished in the appeals court, lenders foreclosed
on the property and the plaintiff no longer owned it.
The appeals court found that by the time it ruled on his appeal,
Maroney no longer had standing to contest matters pertaining to the
special permit. 153 “Having lost the property to foreclosure, [plaintiff] has
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See Murrow v. Emery, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2018).
Maroney v. Plan. Bd., 150 N.E. 3d 11, 13 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020).
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Maroney, 150 N.E. 3d at 16.
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no legal interest in obtaining the permits at issue, and this court should not
adjudicate an issue where one of the purported parties no longer has a live
stake.” 154 The appeals court vacated the fine for two reasons. 155 First, the
notice said that the plaintiff would be subject to a daily fine if he did not
cease and desist, but he did cease, so he did not violate the cease-anddesist order. 156 Second, the city cannot enforce an administrative fine for
a local zoning violation by counter-claiming in an equitable mandamus
action. 157 The city must follow the statutorily outlined procedural
remedy. 158
Pishev v. City of Somerville involved a project pursuant to the
Massachusetts Urban Redevelopment Law, sections 1 through 60 of
chapter 121B of the Massachusetts General Laws. 159 The plaintiffs were
a group of taxpayers in Somerville whose properties were not scheduled
to be taken by eminent domain as part of the redevelopment project. 160
The appeals court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge the redevelopment plan.
[Chapter] 121B “purposely creates no right of appeal from
[redevelopment authority] decisions in its capacity as an urban
renewal agency.” . . . [O]nly landowners whose property is designated
to be taken have standing to challenge the decisions of a local urban
renewal agency and the approval of a [chapter] 121B urban renewal
plan. 161

Sometimes a project may fall within several different provisions of
the General Laws, and a plaintiff might have standing under one
provision, but not under another. Such was the case in Montgomery v.
Board of Selectmen of Nantucket. 162 The underlying zoning issue in
Montgomery was whether the owner of a barn, which was used as an
accessory building located in an historical district, should be allowed to
remove it from the premises. 163 The geographic district was within the
scope of the Nantucket Historic District, a specific statutorily recognized
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 16–17.
159. Pishev v. City of Somerville, 131 N.E. 3d 853, 856 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019), rev.
denied, 483 Mass. 1106 (2019).
160. Id. at 857.
161. Id. at 860.
162. Montgomery v. Bd. of Selectmen, 120 N.E. 3d 1246, 1249 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019).
163. Id. at 1249.
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district. 164
The complaining parties were property owners located within the
Nantucket Historic District, but were not necessarily abutters, or located
across the street, or abutters of abutters located within 300 feet of the
locus. 165 The proposal impacted chapters 40A and 40C of the
Massachusetts General Laws, 166 and the Nantucket Historical District
Act. 167 All parties used the term “person aggrieved,” in defining those
who had standing to contest a decision by the local board, but the term’s
interpretation had varied depending on which statute the plaintiff claims
standing under. 168 Some of the plaintiffs did not qualify for standing
under chapters 40A or 40B, but did qualify under chapter 40C and the
Nantucket Historical District Act.169 Under the Nantucket Historical
District Act, all nearby property owners in the historical district and
organizations dedicated to historical preservation are deemed to have
standing. 170
The appeals court further fleshed out the concept of standing in three
unpublished cases during the same time frame. 171 In Bylinski v. Building
Commissioner of Douglas, the owner of an unbuildable lot by a lake,
nonetheless, built a residence without authority or permit. 172 Through
various enforcement actions he was denied authority to build, ordered to
demolish, appealed and lost, and continually failed to comply with the
demolition order. 173
An abutter brought an action in the land court to enforce the zoning
board of appeals’ and Massachusetts District Court’s orders to
demolish. 174 The town did not participate in the litigation. 175 The land
court ordered enforcement of the demolition order, and the property owner

164. See id.
165. Montgomery, 120 N.E. 3d at 1251–54.
166. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, §§ 13, 17; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40C, § 5.
167. Nantucket Historical District Act, 1970 Mass. Acts 395.
168. Montgomery, 120 N.E. 3d at 1251–53.
169. Id. at 1252.
170. Id.
171. See generally Bylinski v. Building Comm’r, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1113, 2020 WL
1969933 (Apr. 24, 2020); Cotton Tree Serv., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 95 Mass. App. Ct.
1108, 2019 WL 1754357 (Apr. 17, 2019); Lazarek v. Bd. of Appeals, 124 N.E. 3d 161, No. 18P-505, 2019 WL 1422251 (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 29, 2019).
172. Bylinkski, 2020 WL 1969933, at *1.
173. Id. at *1–2.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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appealed. 176 The appeals court held that the abutter did not have
standing. 177 In the order dismissing the action, the appeals court stated
that
“[u]nder Massachusetts law, abutters or neighboring property owners
do not have a private cause of action for direct enforcement of zoning
regulations.” Pursuant to § 7 of the act, “the responsibility for
enforcing ordinances or by-laws lies with the municipality and is
assigned by statute to the building inspector or other specified
municipal officers.” 178

In Cotton Tree Service v. Planning Board of Westhampton, the
plaintiff owned a lumber mill, and applied for a special permit to operate
the mill. 179 The planning board denied the application after a hearing. 180
Cotton Tree appealed the denial to the land court, and ultimately the
parties entered a settlement agreement.181 Under the terms of the
settlement agreement, the matter would be remanded to the planning
board for further action, and if the board did not issue the permit, the court
would independently issue the permit. 182
On remand, the board declined to issue the permit, and Cotton Tree
appealed. 183 An abutter sought to intervene in the land court action in
order to oppose the permit. 184 The abutter’s motion to intervene was
denied because he was not an “person aggrieved,” as the planning board
ruled in his favor. 185 The appeals court reversed finding that by denying
the abutter the right to intervene denied him the right to be heard in
court. 186
In Lazarek v. Board of Appeals of Manchester-By-The-Sea, the
applicant owned a one hundred-foot tall, twelve-story tower which was
built during World War II as a lookout tower for enemy vessels. 187 It had

176. Id.
177. Id. at *7–8.
178. Id. at *7 (quoting Morganelli v. Building Inspector of Canton, 388 N.E. 2d 708,
711–12 (1979)).
179. Cotton Tree Serv., Inc., 2019 WL 1754357, at * 1–2.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *3–4.
187. Lazarek, 2019 WL 1422251, at *1–2.
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been modified several times in the ensuing fifty years. 188 The plaintiff
abutter opposed the most recent application for a special permit for
alterations to the property. 189 The zoning board of appeals upheld the
building commissioner’s decision to grant the permit over the abutter’s
objection. 190 The abutter then appealed to the land court, which entered
judgment for the abutter. 191 In the holding, the appeals court found that
the alleged injuries of the abutter were long-term and not particular to the
abutter. 192 The proposed alterations sought in the application had no effect
on the abutter and, if it did, would be minimal, speculative, or both. 193
Therefore, abutter had not met the test of an “aggrieved person” within
the meaning of the statute.194
3.

Notice

In order to perfect an appeal from the zoning board of appeals or
planning board, a party must file his or her action in the trial court within
twenty days. 195 In addition, however, the plaintiff must also give notice
of the legal proceeding to the city or town clerk within a twenty-day
window following the filing of the judicial action.
“Receipt of notice by the town clerk is a jurisdictional prerequisite for
an action under G.L. c. 40A, § 17, which the courts have ‘policed in
the strongest way’ and given ‘strict enforcement.’” The purpose of
notice to the town clerk is to provide “notice to interested persons that
the decision of the board of appeals has been challenged and may be
overturned.” 196

While the statute requires notice to the clerk in order to establish
jurisdiction and notice usually is provided to the clerk by delivering a copy
of the complaint, the statute does not require that the notice to the clerk be
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at * 3–4.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 17 (2021) (sets out the procedural requirements for a
person aggrieved by a decision of a zoning board of appeals or special permit granting authority
to seek judicial review “by bringing an action within twenty days after the decision has been
filed in the office of the town clerk” and further specifies that “[n]otice of the action with a copy
of the complaint shall be given to such city or town clerk so as to be received within such twenty
days.”); see Hickey v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 103 N.E. 3d 750, 753 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).
196. Hickey, 103 N.E. 3d at 753 (quoting Konover Management Corp. v. Planning Bd,
588 N.E. 2d 1365, 1367 (1992) and Pierce v. Bd. of Appeals, 343 N.E. 2d 412, 415 (1976)).
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in writing. What is required is that the plaintiff give notice to the clerk,
not the form of the notice.
In Hickey v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Dennis, the plaintiff had
timely filed their action but failed to send the required notice to the town
clerk. 197 The clerk’s officer, however, became aware of the action within
the statutory twenty-day timeframe through word of mouth within the
town hall. 198 The issue revolved around whether oral notification was
sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of section 17. 199
Instead of mailing a copy of the complaint to the town clerk, the
plaintiff mailed it to “Chairman, Zoning Board of Appeals” at the town
hall. 200 The town mail room routed the papers to the town planner rather
than the town clerk. 201 On the twentieth day the town planner advised an
assistant town clerk that the plaintiff filed suit and sent a copy to the town
zoning board of appeals. 202 The town clerk personally did not receive any
notice of the filing within twenty days, either in writing or orally. 203
The appeals court found that oral notice of the filing received by an
assistant town clerk from the town planner within the required time was
sufficient to comply with the statutory notice requirement. 204 “[S]trict
compliance with all the details of the notice provision is not required, so
long as notice adequate to serve the purpose of the provision is given
within the period limited.” 205
The United States district court took up a similar issue in Holdcraft
v. Town of Brookfield, which was brought in federal court as a civil rights
case. 206 In Holdcraft, the landowner sought a special permit to build a
shed on his property, which was granted by the zoning board of appeals. 207
Twelve years later, the zoning board of appeals upheld a complaint

197. Id. at 751–53.
198. Id. at 753–54.
199. Id. at 753.
200. Id. at 752.
201. Id. at 754.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 753 (citing Costello v. Bd. of Appeals, 333 N.E. 2d 210, 212 (Mass. App. Ct.
1975); McLaughlin v. Rockland Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 223 N.E. 2d 521, 523 (Mass. 1967);
Carr v. Bd. of Appeals, 280 N.E. 2d 199, 200201 (Mass. 1972); Garfield v. Bd. of Appeals, 247
N.E. 2d 720, 722 (Mass. 1969)).
206. Holdcraft v. Town of Brookfield, 365 F. Supp. 3d 190 (D. Mass. 2019).
207. Id. at 193–94.
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seeking an order to demolish the shed. 208
The landowner timely filed an appeal in the superior court. He
waited until 3:45 p.m. on the twentieth day, however, to serve a copy of
the complaint upon the town clerk. 209 While the town hall was open until
5:00 p.m. on that day, the town clerk’s office closed at 3:00 p.m. every
day (except one day per week not material here), and the landowner failed
to meet the statutory requirement to provide notice to the town clerk
within twenty days.
Where a town clerk does not receive notice by the end of the twentyday statutory notice period, the complaint is subject to dismissal
without regard to the reason for failing to meet the deadline. Under
Massachusetts law, the touchstone of the inquiry appears to be
whether the town clerk had actual notice of the timely filing of the
complaint within the appeals period, regardless of whether the
complaint was actually served on the town clerk. 210

The complaint in Holdcraft was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 211
In contrast to Hickey, there was no evidence in Holdcraft from which the
trial judge could find that the town clerk had received actual notice of the
complaint within twenty-day limit. 212
There are two lessons from Holdcraft: The first is that “twenty days”
means twenty days. Period. The Second lesson is to not play games and
wait until the last possible minute to give notice to the clerk.
Some event outside the plaintiff’s control or a mistake by plaintiff’s
attorney can prevent the plaintiff from giving timely notice. As a result,
the plaintiff loses the right to have his/her claim adjudicated, whereas if
the plaintiff simply gave notice immediately after filing the complaint, the
claim could proceed to adjudication.
These cases taken together emphasize that jurisdiction must be
proven and cannot be overlooked, ignored or assumed. If the statute
requires that notice must be given to a party within a certain amount of
time, the courts recognize that the legislature intended that jurisdiction is
conditioned upon meeting that requirement.
C. Merger
There is a fairly arcane aspect of the law that is applicable to zoning
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 196 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 198.
Id.; see Hickey, 103 N.E. 3d at 754.
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and planning known as “merger.” The purpose of the Doctrine of Merger
is to minimize the number of nonconforming lots created by subsequent
zoning amendments which increase the minimum buildable lot size after
a lot has been created and mapped. 213
By statute, owners of existing lots generally are protected against
newly adopted minimum lot size requirements. However, protection
offered by grandfathering[ 214] must be considered in conjunction with
the doctrine of merger. That doctrine aptly has been summarized as
follows: “Adjacent lots in common ownership will normally be treated
as a single lot for zoning purposes so as to minimize
nonconformities.” 215

The SJC set forth the rule of merger in Sorenti v. Board of Appeals
of Wellesley 216 and Planning Board of Norwell v. Serena. 217 In Serena, a
1990 SJC case, the landowners owned a parcel of land which they
proposed to subdivide into two lots, and then build a single-family home
on each of the two lots, both of which would be nonconforming after the
subdivision. 218 The Serenas would own one of the lots as tenants-by-theentirety, and the second lot would be held in trust with the Serenas as the
sole beneficiaries of the trust. 219
The building inspector ruled that the landowners could build only
one residence, and not two. 220 The land court, the appeals court, 221 and
213. See generally Kneer v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 107 N.E. 3d 497 (Mass. App. Ct.
2018).
214. The appeals court decided in Comstock v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Gloucester,
not to use the term “grandfathered” from that time forward. Comstock v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals, 153 N.E. 3d 395, 400 n.11 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020).
Providing such protection commonly is known—in the case law and otherwise—
as “grandfathering.” We decline to use that term, however, because we
acknowledge that it has racist origins. Specifically, the phrase “grandfather
clause” originally referred to provisions adopted by some States after the Civil War
in an effort to disenfranchise African-American voters by requiring voters to pass
literacy tests or meet other significant qualifications, while exempting from such
requirements those who were descendants of men who were eligible to vote prior
to 1867.
Id. (citations omitted).
215. Kneer, 107 N.E. 3d at 501 (quoting Preston v. Bd. of Appeals, 744 N.E.2d 1126,
1128 (2001)).
216. Sorenti v. Bd. of Appeals, 187 N.E. 2d 499 (Mass. 1963).
217. Plan. Bd. v. Serena, 550 N.E. 2d 1390 (Mass. 1990).
218. Serena, 550 N.E. 2d at 1391.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Plan. Bd. v. Serena, 542 N.E. 2d 314 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989).
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the SJC agreed. 222
[A]ll the land in each of the Serenas’ two lots was available to avoid
or reduce the dimensional nonconformity of either lot viewed in
isolation. . . . ”[T]he condition that the nonconforming lot ‘not be held
in common ownership with any adjoining land’ represents a statutory
codification of a principle of longstanding application in the zoning
context: a landowner will not be permitted to create a dimensional
nonconformity if he could have used his adjoining land to avoid or
diminish the nonconformity.” 223

Eighteen years later, the appeals court revisited the merger issue in
Kneer v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Norfolk. 224 In Kneer, there was a lot
which initially was conforming, but became unconforming when the town
increased the minimum lot size. 225 A subsequent purchaser of the lot
sought a permit to construct a house on the lot, arguing that section 6 of
chapter 40A of the Massachusetts General Laws—as well as a municipal
bylaw accomplishing the same objective—protected the lot from the
subsequent zoning amendment that made the lot nonconforming. 226
The purchaser of the lot held title in the name of the Kneer Family
Revocable Trust. 227 The sole beneficiary of the Trust was Mrs. Kneer. 228
The co-trustees were Mrs. Kneer and one of her daughters. 229 The
daughter owned the adjacent parcel of land at the time when the Kneer
Family Revocable Trust purchased the locus property. 230 The building
inspector denied the permit on the basis that adjacent lots were owned by
the same owner at the time of the zoning amendment. 231 Therefore, the
inspector concluded that the lot had merged for planning purposes with
those adjacent lots prior to the sale of the locus to the Kneer Family
Revocable Trust. 232
The land court rejected that conclusion but, nonetheless, found that
the lot nonetheless was unbuildable. 233 The court reasoned that when the
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Serena, 550 N.E. 2d at 1391.
Id. (citations omitted).
Kneer, 107 N.E. 3d at 498.
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 499; see generally MASS GEN. Laws ch. 40A, § 6.
Kneer, 107 N.E. 3d at 499.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id.
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Family Trust sought the building permit, the adjacent property was owned
by Mrs. Kneer’s daughter, and therefore the Kneer Family Revocable
Trust parcel merged for planning purposes with the daughter’s parcel at
the time of purchase. 234 “[T]he case law recognizes that lots can be
deemed to be held in common ownership . . . even if they nominally are
owned by different entities.” 235
The appeals court disagreed with the land court, finding that the
daughter’s “powers over the parcel necessarily were subject to her
fiduciary obligations.” 236
“Even very broad discretionary powers [of a trustee] are to be
exercised in accordance with fiduciary standards and with reasonable
regard for usual fiduciary principles.” As a trustee, [daughter’s] “first
duty [was] the protection of the trust estate,” and she could not allow
any of her own interests to interfere with those of Kneer, the trust’s
beneficiary. 237

As a result, the appeals court found that there were sufficient
differences between the interests of Mrs. Kneer and of her daughter.238 As
such, the parcel owned by the Kneer Family Revocable Trust should not
be considered to have merged for zoning purposes with the parcel owned
by her daughter. 239
[Daughter] was not in a position in which she lawfully could have
appropriated the parcel as her own; indeed, such conduct would have
amounted
to
an
obvious
breach
of
her
fiduciary
responsibilities. . . . [S]he still could not lawfully use the parcel to
lessen the nonconformity of her own property with the minimum lot
size requirement. It follows that [daughter’s] status as cotrustee of the
trust that owned the parcel did not, by itself, render the two properties
as being held in common ownership. 240

The appeals court came back to this issue approximately two years
later in Murphy v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Billerica. 241 The court in
Murphy reaffirmed its earlier statement that “adjacent lots will be treated
as held in common ownership for zoning purposes, even if title to the lots
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 504.
Id. (first and third alterations in original).
Id. at 504–05.
Id. at 505.
Id. (citation omitted).
See generally Murphy v. Bd. of Appeal, 142 N.E.3d 626 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020).
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is held in nominally different form, if the same owner ‘could have used
[her] adjoining land to avoid or diminish the nonconformity.’” 242
The facts in Murphy are distinguishable from the facts in Kneer. In
Murphy, the prior owners owned two adjacent lots. 243 Both of the lots
were held by husband and wife as tenants-by-the-entirety. 244 They
conveyed one of the lots to the husband’s revocable trust and to the wife’s
revocable trust, as tenants-in-common. 245 Each was the trustee of their
respective trusts, for which they also were the beneficiary. 246 Husband
and wife subsequently conveyed the lot which they held as tenants-by-theentirety to Murphy, who took the position that the now-nonconforming lot
qualified for protection pursuant to section 6 of chapter 40A of the
Massachusetts General Laws. 247
The appeals court disagreed, finding that husband and wife at all
times prior to the transfer of one lot to Murphy had “the ability to ‘use the
adjoining land to avoid or diminish the nonconformity.’” 248 “[Husband
and wife] as sole trustees, settlors, and life beneficiaries of their respective
trusts, with retained power to revoke the trusts entirely, held complete
control over both adjacent properties.” 249 The two parcels had merged for
zoning purposes prior to the conveyance of one of the lots to Murphy, who
bought a lot which was not buildable due to the nonconformity. 250 As a
result, it did not qualify for the protections of section 6 of chapter 40A of
the Massachusetts General Laws.
On a related issue, the appeals court has held that the statute of
limitations in which one must bring an enforcement action on a lot which
may or may not have merged with an adjacent lot for zoning purposes
begins to run on the date of the conveyance of the nonconforming lot to a
third party, not the date of the alleged merger. 251 The doctrine of merger
has the potential to create havoc with land conveyancing.
D. Interpretation of Local Zoning Bylaws
The Massachusetts Appeals Court took up several cases in 2018
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 626.
Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 6 (2020).
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id.
See Bruno v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 97 N.E. 3d. 693 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).
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through 2020, both published and unpublished, involving interpretations
of local zoning bylaws by town boards. Two of these cases involved when
a variance is necessary and when a project may proceed with only a special
permit.
In Comstock v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Gloucester, 252 the appeals
court more finely-tuned the variance versus special permit issue, discussed
above in Bellalta, 253 and in the process distinguished it from its prior
decision in Deadrick v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham. 254 In
Deadrick, the appeals court held that if the renovation of a residence either
created a non-conformity or increased an existing nonconformity, then a
variance would be necessary. 255 In Comstock, the appeals court explained
that the ruling in Deadrick was based upon the conclusion that the local
zoning ordinance would have created a nonconformity because there was
no exception in the local zoning ordinance that would have allowed the
deviation from the height requirement which could be authorized by a
special permit. 256
In Comstock, the local zoning ordinance allowed the zoning board of
appeals to grant a special permit for construction which increased the
extent of the non-conformity so long as the board made a finding that it
would be no more detrimental to the neighborhood than the existing
situation, and the board entered such a finding upon the record.
[E]ven if the extension of the eaves into the airspace of the side yard
were deemed to increase the nonconforming nature of the garage, that
increase still would not require a variance. Rather, as noted above,
municipal zoning boards are empowered to issue special permits allowing
the reconstruction of preexisting nonconforming [structures] that would
increase existing nonconformities so long as they find that the
reconstruction would not be substantially more detrimental to the
neighborhood. 257
The combination of Comstock and Bellalta seem to make clear that
one who has a nonconforming one- or two-family residence and seeks a
renovation which would create a new nonconformity or increase an
existing nonconformity can do so without a variance. That is possible so
long as the local zoning code provides that the zoning board of appeals
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
2019)).

Comstock v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 153 N.E. 3d 395 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020).
See supra Part I.
Deadrick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 11 N.E. 3d 647 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).
Id. at 653–57.
Comstock, 153 N.E. 3d at 401.
Id. at 403 (citing Bellalta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 116 N.E. 3d 17, 30 (Mass.
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can approve the application for a special permit for the condition.
The board must also enter the appropriate findings that the renovated
structure, with the new or increased nonconformity, would be no more
detrimental to the neighborhood than the existing structure. 258 “While
‘meager’ findings can sometimes be ‘legally sufficient,’ nonexistent ones
cannot. . . . [T]he bylaws requires the board to determine, with respect to
alterations to structures that increase their nonconforming nature, ‘that the
alteration is not substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood than
the existing nonconforming structures.’” 259
Barkan v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Truro describes a lengthy
process about demolition and rebuilding of a residential structure. 260 The
appeals court decision outlines how a municipality should not proceed to
resolve disputes about destruction and reconstruction of residences. 261
“[W]hatever else can be said about the process that the town employed
here, we urge municipalities not to follow it as a model.” 262 Despite this
contention, the legal issue in Barkan pertains to the statute of
limitations. 263 The appeals court held that running of the statute of
limitations begins at the time of the violation regardless of when the
objecting party learned of the violation. 264 “We conclude that a violation
is deemed to commence at least by the time that construction began,
because the commencement of construction of a structure improperly
authorized by a building permit placed the property owner in violation of
the zoning bylaw.” 265
Size, design and placement of digital signs and billboards have
become the subject of increasing interest of municipal planning boards
and zoning boards of appeals. The appeals court addressed the issue of
digital billboards and state preemption, as well as the interpretation of
local zoning codes by the local zoning board of appeals, in Clear Channel
Outdoor, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Salisbury. 266
Clear Channel and another competitor both applied for a permit to
258. See also Coady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 1117 (Jan. 18, 2019).
259. Id. at *4–5 (citations omitted).
260. See generally Barkan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 126 N.E. 3d 1008 (Mass. App. Ct.
2019).
261. Id. at 1015.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1016–19.
264. Id. at 1017–18; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 7 (2021).
265. Barkan, 126 N.E. 3d at 1018.
266. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 116 N.E. 3d 1219 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2018).
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install digital billboards in the Town of Salisbury and met all requirements
for approval. 267 However, only one billboard could be installed. 268 Under
the regulatory scheme for electronic digital billboards, the final licensing
decision is vested in the Massachusetts Department of Transportation but
requires the prior approval of the town zoning board. 269
Two members of the board thought that the decision as to which
competitor should be allowed to erect the billboard should be a local
decision rather than a state decision. 270 As a result, they voted to approve
the competitor’s application but not Clear Channel Outdoors’
application. 271 The two members testified that they chose the competitor’s
application because it was filed first.272 As a result, only one application
went forward to the Massachusetts Department of Transportation for
approval. 273 On appeal, the town conceded that the board decision must
be set aside because it rested on impermissible grounds. 274 “When a board
‘injects criteria not found in the enabling act,’ its decision is legally
untenable.” 275
The court took up a local zoning ordinance dealing with scale of
buildings in the downtown district in Sinaiko v. Zoning Board of Appeals
of Provincetown. 276 In Sinaiko, Provincetown had a zoning bylaw for
which the “purpose is to preserve the town’s existing character of
‘buildings that have relatively consistent and harmonious scale within the
neighborhoods,’ and to prevent the construction of ‘newer buildings,
where the appropriate scale has not been maintained, that have disrupted
the character of the neighborhood.’” 277 A landowner could build a
structure that was twenty-five percent larger than the community average
as a matter of right. 278 The community average was calculated by
including all of the structures within 250 feet of the locus, deleting the

267. Id. at 1220–21.
268. Id. at 1221; see also 700 MASS. CODE REGS. § 3.17(5)(g).
269. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 116 N.E. 3d at 1221; see generally 700 MASS. CODE
REGS. § 3.06(1)(i) (2012).
270. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 116 N.E. 3d at 1221.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1222–23.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1224–25.
275. Id. at 1224.
276. Sinaiko v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 102 N.E. 3d 987 (Mass. App. Ct 2018).
277. Id. at 989.
278. Id.
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biggest and smallest, and averaging the rest.279 A landowner could build
a structure larger than twenty-five percent greater than the average only
with a special permit. 280
In Sinaiko, there were only two buildings in the community zone, and
the building commissioner deleted both from the average pursuant to the
zoning bylaw. 281 Having no structures from which to calculate an
average, the building commissioner concluded that there were no
constraints on the proposed structure. 282 The commissioner determined
that a building permit should issue for a building which would be five
times larger than the average of the two buildings which were located in
the 250 foot zone of the locus. 283 The zoning board of appeals upheld the
building commissioner. 284
On appeal of a board decision to the land court or superior court, “the
judge . . . considers whether the decision of the board is arbitrary,
capricious, whimsical, or based on a legally untenable ground. . . . [W]e
extend deference to the reasonable interpretation of local zoning
regulations by the officials charged with their administration and
enforcement.” 285
The decisions of the building commissioner and the zoning board of
appeals appear to be unreasonable on their face. The Town established a
goal of harmonious scale within the neighborhood and a formula outlining
how to determine if the project would be consistent and harmonious with
that scale. The formula in the bylaw required an averaging of other
projects in the area. By eliminating all of the existing projects in the
neighborhood from the calculation, and then determining that there were
no objective standards for the instant project turned the bylaw requiring
harmonious scale on its head.
The appeals court found that the board’s decision was
unreasonable. 286 “[Z]oning board decision[s] will be overturned if ‘based
on a legally untenable ground or [if] it is unreasonable, whimsical,
279. Id. at 989–90.
280. Id. at 989.
281. Id. at 990.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 990–91.
284. Id. at 991.
285. Stevens v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 N.E. 3d 793, 797 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020).
See also Fish v. Accidental Auto Body, Inc., 125 N.E. 3d 774, 781 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019) (“If
the board’s decision is supported by the facts found by the judge, it ‘may be disturbed only if it
is based on a legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable, whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.’”).
286. Sinaiko v. Zoning Bd. Of Appeals, 102 N.E. 3d at 994–95.
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capricious or arbitrary.’” 287 The appeals court found that the building
could be constructed if the board issued as special permit, but not built as
a matter of right. 288
It is important that both the regulatory board and the trial court keep
in mind which party has the burden of proof in an application for a special
permit or variance, and not allow that burden to be transferred, either
expressly or by implication, to the incorrect party. In Fish v. Accidental
Auto Body, the landowner moved for a special permit to construct an auto
body shop in an industrial zoning district. 289
The trial judge found that operation would emit toxins into the air but
would not harm abutters. 290 The appeals court found insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s finding of no harm to the abutters. 291 The
appeals court noted that trial court had, in effect, transferred the burden of
proof from the applicant to the abutters who objected to the permit. 292
In three of the unpublished decisions handed down by the appeals
court in the past three years, the court decided cases involving “excavation
and fill” issues. 293 In Richardson-North Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
the landowner operated a farm. 294 The Zoning Act provides that a
municipality may not “prohibit, unreasonably regulate, or require a special
permit for the use of land for the primary purpose of commercial
agriculture.” 295 This also applies to “uses related to, or incidental to, the
primary agricultural purpose of commercial agriculture.” 296 The
landowner excavated large amounts of gravel from the farm and sold it as
part of his business. 297
In 2015, the landowner entered into a contract to annually import a
minimum of 200,000 tons of fill over ten years, to be deposited in the site

287. Id. at 992.
288. Id.
289. Fish, 125 N.E. 3d at 776.
290. Id. at 777.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 781–82.
293. Richardson-North Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1128, 2020
WL 3708908 (July 7, 2020); Indianhead Realty, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 97 Mass. App.
Ct. 1108, 2020 WL 1542104 (Apr. 1, 2020); Attleboro Sand & Gravel Corp. v. City of
Attleboro, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 1112 (Dec. 11, 2019).
294. Richardson-North, 2020 WL 3708908, at *1.
295. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3 (2021).
296. Richardson-North, 2020 WL 3708908, at *3; see § 3.
297. Richardson-North, 2020 WL 3708908, at *1.
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of the gravel excavation, which began in 2016. 298 In early 2017, the
town’s zoning enforcement investigated the property and issued a cease
and desist order. 299 The landowner appealed the order to the town’s
zoning board of appeals which upheld the cease and desist order. 300 The
board found that the receipt of fill material was not “related to, or
incidental to, the primary agricultural use of land.” 301 The landowner
appealed to the land court, which reversed the board’s decision. 302 The
appeals court reversed the land court, finding that
the judge did not identify any of the board’s grounds for upholding the
notice and order as unreasonable or legally untenable. Instead the
judge simply found that, in his view, the filling operation was
incidental to the agricultural use of the property, and therefore was
lawful. By reversing the board’s decision based only on his own
consideration of the applicable law, the judge improperly substituted
his judgment for that of the board. 303

Richardson-North reminds us to not substitute the judgment of the
trial judge on planning and zoning matters for the judgment of the Zoning
Board of Appeals or the Planning Board.
In Indianhead Realty, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, the landowner
operated a recreational facility and sought to substantially increase the size
of the facility and the number of services provided. 304 The project would
have removed approximately 475,000 cubic feet of material over two
years and resulted in a “punch bowl” depression in the land. 305 The
landowner would have sold the excavated material for between $655,000
and $998,000. 306
The town zoning bylaw had a “Natural Features Conservation
Requirement” that provided that removal of more than ten cubic yards of
soil, gravel, or quarried rock for sale or use elsewhere required special
permit unless such removal was “incidental to or required” by the matter
of right construction on the same site. 307 The court found that the

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
Indianhead Realty, Inc., 2020 WL 1542104, at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
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excavation of material was far in excess of that which was “incidental to
and required” for the project which was allowed as a matter of right. 308
As a result, the excavation constituted the creation of an unlawful
commercial quarry on the land, and required a special permit. 309 “[T]he
terms ‘incidental to and required’ shall be defined as only of the amount
of material reasonably necessary to allow a use to be conducted or a
structure . . . to be constructed in compliance with the applicable legal
requirements for such use, structure, or road.” 310
In Attleboro Sand & Gravel Corp. v. City of Attleboro, the landowner
operated a quarry, stone processing plant and a ready-mix concrete
plant. 311 The landowner sought to construct an asphalt plant on the site,
which was in a newly designated Industrial Business District. 312 The town
granted a special permit for the project, but the applicant sued, alleging
that it could build the asphalt plant as a matter of right. 313
The land court and the appeals court both found that the asphalt plant
was not authorized as a matter of right under the zoning bylaw. 314 Both
courts held that the project did not meet any of the definitions of activities
allowed as a matter of right. 315 “We conclude that the land court judge
correctly interpreted the ordinance to exclude asphalt production from the
definitions of both ‘processing and treating’ raw materials and ‘light
manufacturing.’” 316
Sand and gravel excavation operations are common throughout the
Commonwealth. Municipal regulatory boards are in the best position to
determine whether to allow such operations, where to locate such
operations, and what is the reasonable scope of those operations.
Workforce and affordable housing projects are extremely important
in many communities throughout the Commonwealth due to the high cost
of housing in many communities and decreasing supply of housing which
is affordable to those families with below median levels of income for
those communities.
In Arena v. Town of Nantucket, the developer sought to build sixty308. Id. at *2–3.
309. Id. at *3–4.
310. Id. at *2.
311. Attleboro Sand & Gravel Corp. v. City of Attleboro, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 1112, 2019
WL 6724489 (Dec. 11, 2019).
312. Id. at *1.
313. Id.
314. Id. at *3.
315. Id. at *1–3.
316. Id. at *3.
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four workforce housing units on two adjacent parcels of land. 317 The
municipality had a zoning bylaw providing that the minimum lot size for
workforce rental community was 60,000 square feet, that the maximum
number of dwelling units on a single lot cannot exceed thirty-two, and that
the total number of bedrooms cannot exceed fifty-seven. 318 The bylaw
also provided for “aggregation of buildings” and that workforce rental
community projects could be adjacent to each other. 319 The plaintiff
objected to the permit, alleging that it called for twice the number of
allowable housing units. 320 The planning board, land court, and appeals
court all rejected the plaintiff’s position.321
“[A]llowing two qualifying developments to be built side by side”
furthers the purpose of the bylaw and complies with the bylaw’s
structural requirements. Each lot is more than 60,000 square feet and
they are “being developed jointly as one (1) cohesive project.” The
judge found that the project satisfied the unit and bedroom limitations
because it comprises two adjacent communities. 322

But in Bernstein v. Planning Board of Wayland, the plaintiff and the
town entered into a consent decree to resolve a dispute about a mixed-use
development in plaintiff’s immediate vicinity.323 Years later, the town
unilaterally sought to change a material condition of the consent decree
without input from the plaintiff.324 The appeals court remanded the case
to allow the plaintiff to be heard. 325
“[A]ltering the material terms of [a consent decree] at the behest of
one party, without the consent of the other, does violence to the second
party’s expectations and to the very concept of judgment by consent.”
Thus, the burden on a party to modify a consent judgment entered
against it is perhaps ‘more formidable’ than ‘had the party litigated
and lost.’ 326

317. Arena v. Town of Nantucket, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 1116, 2020 WL 116011 (Jan. 10,
2020).
318. Id. at *1.
319. Id.
320. Id. at *2.
321. Id. at *2.
322. Id. at *2.
323. Bernstein v. Plan. Bd., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 1114, 2018 WL 6713270 (Dec. 21, 2018).
324. Bernstein, 2018 WL 6713270, at *1–2.
325. Id. at *3.
326. Id. at *2 (citations omitted); see also Stevens v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 N.E.
3d 793, 794 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020) (an abutter is not bound by a settlement agreement between
the landowner and the town in a legal action in which he did not participate).
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The appeals court vacated the judgment of the land court due to a
lack of evidence to support the land court’s conclusion that there was no
dispute of material fact in Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals of
Worcester. 327 In Johnson, the defendant owned an ice cream shop in a
residential-use-only district of the city, which made it nonconforming. 328
The defendant sought to expand the structure of the nonconforming
business and also sought a variance due to insufficient parking. 329 The
zoning board of appeals approved the permit and variance, and its decision
was upheld by the land court in a motion for summary judgment. 330 The
appeals court found an insufficient evidentiary showing to establish no
dispute of material fact and reversed. 331
In Charkoudian v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Wilbraham, the court
considered when does a structure, that unquestionably does not exist, still
In Charkoudian, a
exist for zoning and planning purposes. 332
nonconforming family residence was destroyed by a tornado. 333 Years
later a member of the family sought to reconstruct the building with
certain alterations and modifications on the same site. 334 Another family
member objected. 335 The zoning board of appeals denied the permit
because it was not an alteration to “[a] non-conforming single-family or
two-family residential structure,” 336 as the building had been destroyed
several years before. 337 The land court annulled the board’s decision. 338
The appeals court reversed, finding that the land court’s conclusion
was unreasonable because it did not “construe[] [the bylaw provisions] in
the context of the by-law as a whole, [giving it] a sensible and practical
meaning within that context.” 339 The landowner could have rebuilt the
prior structure as a matter of right so long as there were no alterations to
327. Johnson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 1109, 2019 WL 6034797
(Nov. 14, 2019).
328. Johnson, 2019 WL 6034797, at *1.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at *2.
332. Charkoudian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 1104, 2019 WL 4927064,
at *1 (Oct. 7, 2019).
333. Charkoudian, 2019 WL 4927064, at *1.
334. Id.
335. Id. at *2.
336. Id. at *1 (quoting § 3-3-3 of the local zoning bylaw).
337. Id. at *2.
338. Id.
339. Id. at *3 (citing Miles-Matthias v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 4 N.E. 3d 309, 317 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2014)).
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the original design. 340 Having rebuilt the structure, the landowner then
could have altered or modified it as a matter of right because it then would
be an existing nonconforming one or two story residential structure as
permitted by local zoning ordinances. 341
Finality of a decision to amend or not to amend a municipal zoning
bylaw provides the necessary stability for developers to initiate new
projects based upon those zoning bylaws. A lack of stability in the zoning
bylaws could cause developers to unnecessarily commit large amounts of
money to initiate new projects only to have those projects prohibited by
rapidly changing bylaws, or to avoid new projects altogether in that
municipality due to instability of the zoning bylaws.
The Zoning Act provides that a city council, town council, or other
legislative body can consider a rejected zoning ordinance only after two
years. 342 In 2015, the Town of Barnstable proposed “to amend the town’s
zoning ordinance to create the [Hyannis parking overlay district], which
would overlay two existing districts, a residential district and the Harbor
District.” 343 The proposed zoning amendment was defeated at the town
council. 344 A few weeks later, the town council decided to “withdraw”
the failed zoning proposal, to reconsider amending the Hyannis Parking
Overly District proposal with several changes to the original proposed
zoning amendment, and passed the “new” amendment to the town zoning
code. 345
The appeals court concluded that the “new” proposed amendment
was “fundamentally and essentially the same” as the original proposed
amendment, and the proposed amendment was in violation of section 5 of
chapter 40A of the Massachusetts General Laws.346 The appeals court
upheld the order of the land court annulling the amendment to the
Barnstable zoning code. 347 The decision of the appeals court upholds the
legislature’s determination to establish stability in municipal zoning
340. Id. at * 2–3.
341. Id. at *3–4.
342. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (2021) (“No proposed zoning ordinance or by-law
which has been unfavorably acted upon by a city council or town meeting shall be considered
by the city council or town meeting within two years after the date of such unfavorable action
unless the adoption of such proposed ordinance or by-law is recommended in the final report of
the planning board.”).
343. Penn v. Town of Barnstable, 133 N.E. 3d 846, 848 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019), rev.
denied, 137 N.E. 3d 1076 (Mass. 2019).
344. Id. at 848.
345. Id. at 848–49.
346. Id. at 851–52; see generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (2021).
347. Penn, 133 N.E. 3d at 852.
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bylaws.
In Leonard v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Hanover, the appeals court
relied upon the wording of the local zoning ordinance and found that
display racks located outside a retail store were not part of the structure.348
Therefore, those racks were not a prior nonconforming use protected by
section 6 of chapter 40A of the Massachusetts General Laws. 349 The court
also found that a row of barrels placed along the property line with the
adjacent business did “not ‘change’ or ‘alter’ the lot or its use.” 350
The federal courts also issued two unpublished decisions addressing
the interpretation of local zoning bylaws. In Signs for Jesus v. City of
Pembroke, NH, 351 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
upheld a zoning bylaw which prohibited the use of “electronic changing
signs,” except in one limited district of town. 352 Even when the applicant
was a religious organization raising a First Amendment freedom of speech
claim, the court held that the restriction was content neutral and “narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” 353 “A speech
restriction is sufficiently narrowly tailored so long as the ‘regulation
promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation.’” 354 The court concluded that the town
had “an interest in ‘preserving the existing neighborhood characteristics
and aesthetics, including the rural and natural look of Pembroke.’” 355
In Mannai Home LLC v. City of Fall River, the plaintiff wanted to
renovate an existing structure and open it as a group home for persons
recovering from drug and alcohol abuse. 356 The city denied the request. 357
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found
that “[g]roups of individuals recovering from drug and alcohol abuse may
be considered ‘disabled’ for purposes of section 3 [G.L. c. 40A, § 3].” 358
The ordinance treats families (and religious organizations) with five
348. Leonard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 135 N.E. 3d 288, 293–94 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019).
349. Id. at 295.
350. Id. at 296.
351. Signs for Jesus v. Town of Pembroke, 977 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 2020).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 106 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,796 (1989)).
354. Id. at 106 (citations omitted).
355. Id. at 106.
356. Mannai Home, LLC v. City of Fall River, No. 17-CV-11915-FDS, 2019 WL
456163 (D. Mass. Feb. 5, 2019).
357. Mannai Home, LLC, 2019 WL 456163, at *1.
358. Id. at *8 (citing Brockton Fire Dep’t v. St. Mary’s Broad Street, LLC, 181 F. Supp.
3d 155, 157 (D. Mass. 2016)).
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or more persons differently from group residences for the disabled,
which the statute does not permit. It follows that the City could not
require Mannai to obtain a special permit, and that doing so would
constitute “discrimination” within the meaning of the Zoning Act. 359

The district court denied summary judgment on the zoning question
to both sides. 360
Every month throughout the Commonwealth planning boards and
zoning boards of appeal meet to review and approve or deny applications
for special permits, variances, development agreements, requests to
modify zoning bylaws in order authorize new forms of development, etc.
Every month municipal zoning boards are taking actions which involve
interpretation of their own municipal zoning bylaws.
A certain number of these actions result in judicial review in the Land
Court, Superior Court, or United States District Court, and/or the state and
federal appellate courts. All of these cases demonstrate that the local
zoning boards are best able to interpret their own zoning bylaws, and that
those holdings should be and are upheld upon judicial review unless they
are clearly in conflict with those bylaws, unsupported by the evidence
before the board, or actions which are otherwise arbitrary and capricious.
E. Cell Phone and Internet Tower Construction
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts decided
eight cases regarding proposals to construct cell phone towers during 2018
through 2020. 361 The Massachusetts Appeals Court published one
decision on the issue during the same period. 362
A complete and in-depth discussion of the law pertaining to cell
phone tower construction is beyond the scope of this Article, but one issue
warrants discussion here. Cities and towns continue to have difficulty

359. Id.
360. Id. (the court denied in part and granted in part the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, but all of the zoning related issues were denied).
361. See, e.g., T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Town of Barnstable, 969 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2020);
VWI Towers, LLC v. Town of North Andover Plan. Bd., 404 F. Supp. 3d 456 (D. Mass. 2019);
Miller v. SBA Towers V, LLC, 391 F. Supp. 3d 123 (D. Mass. 2019); Varsity Wireless Invs.,
LLC v. Town of Hamilton, 370 F. Supp. 3d 292 (D. Mass. 2019); Indus. Towers & Wireless,
LLC. v. Haddad, 109 F. Supp. 3d 284 (D. Mass. 2015); Extenet Sys., Inc. v. City of Cambridge,
481 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D. Mass. 2020); T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Town of Barnstable, No. 19-CV10982, 2020 WL 3270878 (D. Mass. June 17, 2020); Eco-Site, Inc. v. Town of Wilmington,
No. 17-10304-MBB, 2019 WL 1332621 (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2019); Am. Towers LLC v. Town
of Shrewsbury, No.17-10642-FDS (D. Mass. June 22, 2018).
362. Cellco P’ship v. City of Peabody,157 N.E. 3d 609 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020).
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navigating the intersection of the Massachusetts Zoning Act, local zoning
ordinances, and the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. 363
All of these recent cases deal with whether the applicant
demonstrated a “gap in service,” whether there was any reasonable
alternative to the proposed cell tower construction, and/or whether
wireless service would essentially be prohibited from a denial of the
permit. 364 Local boards have struggled in determining what standards to
apply when acting upon cell tower construction applications. 365 Several
conclusions arise from these cases.
A local board must apply the standards set forth in chapter 40A of
the Massachusetts General Laws, and their local zoning bylaws, to the
application. 366 The record must be clear that the board considered these
standards and rested its decision solely and exclusively upon these
standards. 367 If the record reflects that the local board based its decision
on the federal Telecommunications Act instead of state and local zoning
law, the board’s decision is virtually guaranteed to be reversed and
vacated, either by Massachusetts appellate courts or the federal courts, due
to a failure to apply the proper law to the application.368
The local board should consider all of the standards set forth in the
Federal Telecommunications Act, 47 U.C.C. §§ 332(c)(3) and (C)(7), in
their deliberations, and ensure that the record contains sufficient evidence
to establish each conclusion which the board reaches, either expressly or
by inference. 369 If evidence in the record does not establish (1) that there
is no gap in service, (2) that the board did consider and eliminate all
alternative locations, and/or (3) that a denial of the application would not
essentially prohibit wireless services, then the board’s decision is virtually
guaranteed to be reversed and vacated by the federal courts. 370
The federal courts repeatedly point out that they cannot compel local
boards to account for all issues under the federal Telecommunications
Act, but also point out at the same time that it would be a good idea for

363. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
364. See generally cases cited supra note 361; and Cellco P’ship, 157 N.E. 3d 609.
365. Id.
366. See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A.
367. See generally cases cited supra note 361; and Cellco P’ship, 157 N.E. 3d 609.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
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them to do so. 371
Local boards retain the authority to exercise their authority under
chapter 40A of the Massachusetts General Laws and local zoning
ordinances. 372 In the exercise of that authority, however, local boards
must ensure that they base their decisions upon the Zoning Act and local
bylaws, and if they deny an application for construction of a tower the
record must contain substantial evidence to establish that there is no gap
in service, or that there are other alternative sites available to address the
gap in service, and that the denial of a particular application does not result
in the prohibition or essentially the prohibition of all wireless services.
III. MISCELLANEOUS APPEALS COURT DECISIONS
There are four decisions of the appeals court that do not fit nicely
within one of the previously discussed categories but warrant some
mention. In Green v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Southborough, the court
found that the applicant had “exercised” a use variance within the oneyear window contained in section 10 of chapter 40A of the Massachusetts
General Laws. 373
“Exercise” for these purposes “means ‘to bring into play: make
effective in action . . . bring to bear.’” A variance need not be fully
carried out for rights to be “exercised” within the meaning of [the
statute]. “A ‘use’ variance may not require any construction or
excavation, and a building permit may not be necessary to exercise
such a variance. Evidence of ‘use’ within one year of issuance of the
variance may be sufficient to exercise such a variance.” 374

The town did not issue the comprehensive permit until fifteen months
after the filing of the use variance in the registry, and the applicant had not

371. See, e.g., T-Mobile North East LLC v. Town of Barnstable, 969 F.3d 33 (1st Cir.
2020);VWI Towers, LLC v. Town of North Andover Plan. Bd., 404 F. Supp. 3d 456 (D. Mass.
2019); Miller v. SBA Towers V, LLC, 391 F. Supp. 3d 123 (D. Mass. 2019); Varsity Wireless
Invs., LLC v. Town of Hamilton, 370 F. Supp. 3d 292 (D. Mass. 2019); Indus. Towers &
Wireless, LLC. v. Haddad, 109 F. Supp. 3d 284 (D. Mass. 2015); Extenet Sys., Inc. v. City of
Cambridge, 481 F. Supp. 3d 41 (D. Mass. 2020); T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Town of Barnstable,
No. 19-CV-10982, 2020 WL 3270878 (D. Mass. June 17, 2020); Eco-Site, Inc. v. Town of
Wilmington, No. 17-10304-MBB, 2019 WL 1332621 (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2019); Am. Towers
LLC v. Town of Shrewsbury, No.17-10642-FDS (D. Mass. June 22, 2018). See also Cellco
P’ship v. City of Peabody,157 N.E. 3d 609 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020).
372. See generally cases cited supra note 361; and Cellco P’ship, 157 N.E. 3d 609. See
also 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(3) and (c)(7).
373. Green v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 133 N.E. 3d 821, 823 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019).
374. Id. at 827 (citations omitted).
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actually begun construction. 375
In the interim, however, the builder timely pursued the
comprehensive permit, and took other steps to exercise the variance:
he engaged engineers, wetland specialists, and other professionals to
redesign and modify the development plan to comply with the
requirements and conditions of the use variance and that he expended
more than $696,000 in that effort, as well as more than $85,000 in
consulting fees on behalf of the Town. . . . [T]hey were taken—at least
in part—to satisfy a condition of the use variance. 376

This is a common-sense interpretation of the statute. It was not
possible for the builder to actually commence construction within the 12month period because of conditions outside his control, i.e., the failure of
the town to issue the comprehensive permit within the 12-month window
and the builder did everything within his power to exercise the variance.
Occasionally the doctrine of collateral estoppel will bar an applicant
or respondent from asserting a claim in an application for a special permit
or variance. In Barry v. Planning Board of Belchertown, the appeals court
found that collateral estoppel did not apply to an application for an ANR
application. 377
The town had approved a subdivision in 1987. 378 Thirty years later,
the landowner applied for an ANR endorsement for two additional lots on
the same street. 379 The board and the court, however, found that the facts
material to the litigation had changed and that collateral estoppel was not
appropriate in this circumstance. 380 Collateral estoppel is not appropriate
unless the parties are the same, or at least share a common interest, and
the facts and circumstances remain essentially the same as the prior action
such that there should be the same answer to the question.
“Non-Conforming uses” pertains to uses which were within the
scope of the zoning bylaws when originally undertaken, but have since
become in violation of the zoning bylaw simply because the zoning bylaw
has changed. Generally speaking, a party is entitled to continue the use
which originally was lawful but now is in violation of the updated zoning
bylaw.
In an unpublished decision, Browne v. Zoning Board of Appeals of
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

Id. at 824.
Id.
Barry v. Plan. Bd., 134 N.E. 3d 600, 609 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020).
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 608–09.
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Rockport, the court found that a rebuilt structure was still entitled to the
status of a nonconforming “inn” under municipal zoning bylaw despite
some changes in operation. 381 The property was used as a hotel or inn for
over one hundred years. 382 The use became nonconforming due to an
amendment to the zoning bylaw, but was entitled to continue operation as
an existing nonconformity. 383 The building had to be rebuilt due to
damage, and the owner made some minor modifications in operation. 384
[W]e rely for guidance on the three-pronged test set out in Powers v.
Building Inspector of Barnstable, asking: (1) whether the current use
reflects the nature and purpose of the prior use; (2) whether there is a
difference in the quality or character, as well as the degree, of use; and
(3) whether the current use is different in kind in its effect on the
neighborhood than the prior use. 385

In Johenning v. Planning Board of Milton, another unpublished
opinion, the court held that a business for which a use permit issued to a
particular operator or his family could be operated by successor members
of the initial recipient’s family using a corporate form. 386 The permit,
however, was held by the family members personally and not by the
corporation. 387
CONCLUSION
The Massachusetts Appeals Court and Supreme Judicial Court, as
well as the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit resolved a very
large number of cases arising from municipal planning boards and zoning
boards of appeals in Massachusetts during the period 2019 and 2020. The
sheer number of these cases is somewhat surprising. These cases
demonstrate that there is a great deal of uncertainty about Massachusetts
land use, planning and zoning laws among the municipal regulatory
boards, the legal community and the planning community.
For the most part, the cases summarized above don’t announce any
significant new change or development of the law. What they do

381. Browne v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1109, 2020 WL 1609129
(Apr. 2, 2020).
382. Browne, 2020 WL 1609129, at *1.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at *2.
386. Johenning v. Plan. Bd., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 1109, 2020 WL 4918025 (Aug. 21, 2020).
387. Johenning, 2020 WL 4918025, at *1.
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highlight, however, is that small changes in facts from previously decided
cases can significantly alter the expected outcome of new applications.
The central lessons learned from these cases is that generally
speaking the statutes mean what they say. The regulatory boards must
identify all of the “elements” upon which the board must make findings
in order to have a factual basis to support their decisions. Those boards
are generally in the best position to interpret their own zoning bylaws and
that courts should not substitute their judgment on planning and zoning
issues for that of the regulatory board. Both the regulatory boards and
courts must act reasonably rather than arbitrarily or capriciously when
rendering a decision. Finally, if the meaning of statutory language is not
clear and unambiguous, then courts must identify—and apply—the
legislative intent to arrive at a reasonable conclusion consistent with that
language.
With regard to the construction of cell towers and internet
communication facilities, both regulatory boards and practitioners must
recognize all applicable state and federal laws. This recognition is
essential to ensure that the administrative record supports whatever
actions are taken by the regulatory boards. I would expect the same
pattern of judicial interpretation to continue in future years.

